Free Will

Free Will

Sam van der Hoeven

What is free will? I might define it shortly as the capacity for choice. Someone might call it the ability to choose, but this conflates two distinct things: capacity and ability. To illustrate, a prisoner with no ability to choose where he sleeps, what he eats, or where to spend his weekends still has the capacity for choice. He only lacks the power for action. Which is to say he still has the desires he would otherwise have, but he presently lacks the power to act upon those desires. Conversely, something like a tree which has no capacity for choice must only grow up, put out green leaves, and suffer a pesky bird nesting in its branches. The distinction seems clear to me. Though neither the prisoner nor the tree are free to take action, the prisoner maintains his capacity for choice, to want what he wants. Imprisoned as he is, his will remains free. So free will has more to do with capacity than ability.

This I think is often confused in conversations about free will. Capacity for choice is confused with power for action. Some people mean the latter while referring to the former. They wish for free to mean powerful. But free does not mean powerful. Free does not mean unassailable. Free does not mean incontestable. Free certainly does not mean god. Free will refers not to power but capacity. To what one wants, not what one does.

This is a very important distinction. Consider as an example human society and authority. All the members of a society have the same capacity for choice. It may be that only a few have the power to take action, and that the actions they take will have sweeping effects on the experience of those beneath and around them. Yet all share the same capacity for choice. Those with less power do not in any way have less free will. This to me actually underscores the importance of democracy with respect to human flourishing, which is an important subject to explore another time.

For now, however, it is more important to relate this distinction to thoughts of God, and this is exactly why I bring this up in the first place. For I have too often heard God accused of monstrosity, of robbing people of the free will which He bestowed on them. "How can He assign some to Heaven and others to Hell?" "How can He impose His will on the elect, whether they like it or not?" "How can He do anything sovereign at all without infringing upon the free will of His subjects?" These are important questions! And they are cleared right up by remembering what we have just discussed.

God, who at all times possesses both the capacity for choice and the power to act upon those choices, can at any time do whatever He pleases without compromising the capacity for choice of His subjects.

That sentence is dense, let's break it apart. First: God at all times possesses both the capacity for choice and the power to act upon those choices. He is the only being who can make that claim. This is the definition of supreme authority, for none can thwart Him. His will is the final decider, because whatever He wants He has the power to do. Capacity for choice with unlimited power to enact those choices. Because of this then, second: God can at any time do whatever He pleases. There are no checks and balances for the power of God. His is the one and only totally unmitigated free will. And yet, third: the administration of His supreme will does not compromise the capacity for choice of His subjects. Man retains the capacity for choice. Their power may be subverted, and therefore at times their choice may have little weight or bearing, but the capacity is there nevertheless.

And this will make us feel all sorts of ways, which is what we will discuss next.